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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WILD WILLOW LIMITED COMPANY,
a Utah Limited Liability
Company,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 940311

v.
TOWN OF FRANCIS, a municipal
corporation; BRAD McNEIL,
individually and as Mayor of
the Town of Francis,

Category No. 10

Defendants/Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case is before the Court on interlocutory appeal
of the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction.
The Court has jurisdiction to hear the case under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Did the district court err in granting a

preliminary injunction where Wild Willow Limited Company neither
satisfied nor attempted to satisfy all four requirements of rule
65A(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the preliminary injunction
rule?
An appellate court may disturb a trial court's judgment
granting an injunction if the court abused its discretion or the
judgment rendered is clearly against the weight of the evidence.

Birch Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 990, 993 (Utah
1993).

If the trial court bases its grant of an injunction on a

misconception of the requirements of the pertinent rule of civil
procedure, that decision is necessarily an abuse of discretion.
See Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah App. 1990) (because
the trial court based its decision to exclude expert testimony on
the court's misconception of the law, that decision was
necessarily an abuse of discretion), cert. denied (Utah Jan. 11,
1991); Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande R.R., 830 P.2d 291, 297
(Utah App.) (trial court abuses its discretion when it exceeds
the procedural authority granted it by the court rules), cert,
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
Citation to record where issue preserved in the trial
court:

R. 78-79.
2.

Did the district court err in not applying the

deferential statutory standard for review of a municipality's
land use decision in concluding that Wild Willow is likely to
prevail on its claim that the Francis Town Council improperly
suspended the prior plat approval for Wild Willow's subdivision?
An appellate court independently reviews a district
court's interpretation of a statute for correctness.

Ward v.

Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990).
Citation to record where issue preserved in the trial
court:

R. 73.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 65A(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Grounds. A restraining order or preliminary
injunction may issue only upon a showing by
the applicant that:
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable
harm unless the order or injunction issues;
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant
outweighs whatever damage the proposed order
or injunction may cause the party restrained
or enjoined;
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would
not be adverse to the public interest; and
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that
the applicant will prevail on the merits of
the underlying claim, or the case presents
serious issues on the merits which should be
the subject of further litigation.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (1992):
(1) No person may challenge in district
court a municipality's land use decisions
made under this chapter or under the
regulation made under authority of this
chapter until that person has exhausted his
administrative remedies,
(2) Any person adversely affected by any
decision made in the exercise of the
provisions of this chapter may file a
petition for review of the decision with the
district court within 30 days after the local
decision is rendered.
(3) The courts shall:

(a) presume that land use decisions and
regulations are valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 1, 1994, Wild Willow Limited Company filed
suit against the Town of Francis and its Mayor, Brad McNeil, for
injunctive and monetary relief based primarily on the Town
Council's allegedly wrongful rescission of Wild Willow's
previously approved plat for a subdivision development in
Francis, Utah (R. 1-23A).

It filed an amended complaint on May

19, 1994 (R. 32-56).
On May 20, 1994, Wild Willow filed a motion for a
temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction
(R. 57-63) .

That motion sought an order from the trial court

restraining the Town and Mayor from enforcing the Town Council's
decision to rescind the prior plat approval and a related stop
work order served by the Mayor on Wild Willow (id.).
On May 25, 1994, the trial court heard and granted the
motion for a preliminary injunction against the Town and Mayor
(T. 31-32) .

The court entered a written preliminary injunction

on June 3, 1994 (R. 131-32).

The Town filed a motion for

suspension of the injunction pending disposition of a petition
for interlocutory appeal, which the court denied (R. 142-45, 25960) .
On June 17, 1994, the Town filed a petition for
permission to appeal the preliminary injunction in this Court,
along with a motion for suspension of the injunction pending
disposition of the petition (R. 177-210).

On July 15, 1994, this

Court granted the motion for suspension of the injunction, and on
4

July 20, 1994, granted the petition for interlocutory appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The material facts are not in dispute.1

Plaintiff,

Wild Willow Limited Company ("Wild Willow"), is the owner of
property located within the Town of Francis and desires to
develop a subdivision2 on that property, which will likely
double the population of that small town.3

Wild Willow obtained

final plat approval of the first of three phases of its
development from the Town Planning Commission on December 7,
1993.

On December 15, 1993, the Town Council issued its final

plat approval for the first phase.

Wild Willow recorded the plat

with the Summit County Recorder in January 1994.

This is the

first subdivision plan that was presented to the Town for
approval under the Town's new Development Code ("Code").
Subsequently, a newly constituted Town Council reviewed
the question of Wild Willow's noncompliance with certain
significant requirements of the Code in obtaining final plat
approval and the additional question of whether the Council had
erroneously given such approval in light of that noncompliance.
The Council held a special meeting and rescinded the prior plat
1

This statement of facts is drawn from the trial court's
Findings of Fact and the parties' pleadings in the trial court
(R. 57-60, 70-79, 137-38).
2

Technically, it seeks to develop a "planned unit
development" under the Development Code of the Town of Francis.
"Subdivision" is used generically here.
3

Francis is a town of approximately 450 people, which is
located about 15 miles east of Park City. Wild Willow's multiphase development contemplates the construction of 153 homes.
5

approval on March 15, 1994.

The Town's attorney advised Wild

Willow of the rescission in a letter dated March 25, 1994.
Having received the March 25th letter and thus fully
aware of the Council's rescission, Wild Willow nevertheless began
taking bids for construction of the utilities and other
improvements for the development on or about March 30, 1994.
Thereafter, it entered into construction contracts.
On April 1, 1994, Wild Willow filed suit against the
Town and its mayor, Brad McNeil, alleging that the Town Council
had wrongfully rescinded the final plat approval.

The suit

requested injunctive and monetary relief (R. 1-23A) .

On May 16,

1994, the Town, through the Mayor, issued a stop work order to
Wild Willow which required it to cease construction of the
development.

Wild Willow filed an amended complaint on May 19,

1994 (R. 32-56) .
On May 20, 1994, Wild Willow filed a motion for a
temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction
(R. 57-63) .

An affidavit of C. Taylor Burton, a principal of

Wild Willow, accompanied Wild Willow's four-page motion, but no
memorandum of law was submitted.

(Copies of Wild Willow's motion

and the Burton affidavit are contained in Addendum A ) .

Wild

Willow noticed a hearing for May 25, 1994 (R. 68-69).
On May 24, 1994, the Town Council convened a special
meeting, fully noticed to Wild Willow and the public, to review
its rescission decision and to receive comment from Wild Willow
and the public.

After hearing comment and discussing the matter,
6

the Council voted to put the final plat approval "on hold"
pending full compliance by Wild Willow with the Code's
requirements.

The Council also decided that no building permits

were to be issued for the development during the period in which
final plat approval was suspended.
Of clear concern to the Council were the health, safety
and welfare issues of Wild Willow's failure to file, prior to
approval by either the Town Planning Commission or the Council
and as required by the Code, (1) an Environmental Impact
Statement, (2) a letter from the local fire protection district
indicating its final approval of the plan for fire protection
measures, (3) documentation that sufficient water had been
transferred and dedicated to the Town for the development, and
(4) a statement from the State Health Department containing
recommendations pertaining to the proposed sewage disposal system
and treatment facilities.
The next day, the district court held the scheduled
hearing on Wild Willow's motion for a temporary restraining order
and/or a preliminary injunction.

At that hearing, Wild Willow

presented no evidence of the basis of the Town Council's
decisions of March 15 and May 24, 1994 to rescind the final plat
approval and then to put it "on hold," and proceeded solely on
its verified complaint, the Burton affidavit, and a copy of the
recorded plat (T. 3-32) .
The district court granted a preliminary injunction,
concluding that (1) "by reason of the final approval of Phase I
7

and the recording of the plat, plaintiff has a vested right to
proceed with the development of the subdivision"; (2) "by reason
of the actions of the Town, plaintiff is suffering and will
continue to suffer great and irreparable harm in the form of lost
lot sales, the loss of the contractor and/or substantial cost of
delay, the loss of a building season with attendant costs and
expenses, together with the loss of use of property in accordance
with the vested rights of plaintiff"; and (3) "the plaintiff has
shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits."
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 3 (copies of the
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the
Preliminary Injunction appear as Addendum B ) .
The injunction, signed by the court on June 3, 1994,
enjoins and directs the Town and Mayor McNeil as follows:
1. From enforcing that certain Stop Order
Notice dated May 16, 1994.
2. From taking any action which purports to
rescind the final approval of Wild Willow
Planned Development including any action to
put the approval of said project on hold.
3. The Town is hereby directed, by and
through the Town engineer, to approve the
plans and specifications for the utility
improvements and to advise plaintiff as to
the method of inspection of such improvements
as they are constructed.
4. The Town is hereby directed, by and
through appropriate officials, to consider
and approve, where otherwise appropriate, the
necessary building permits.
Preliminary Injunction at 2 (Addendum B ) .

8

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the applicant must
satisfy four distinct requirements set forth in rule 65A(e), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

In making application for a

preliminary injunction, Wild Willow neither satisfied nor
attempted to satisfy all four requirements, arguing only two of
the four requirements: that if an injunction were not issued it
would suffer irreparable harm, and that it enjoyed a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits.
The district court granted a preliminary injunction,
entering findings only on the two factors argued by Wild Willow.
The court failed to consider or make any findings on the other
two requirements of rule 65A(e):

that the threatened injury to

the applicant outweighs whatever damage the injunction may cause
the party enjoined, and that the injunction, if issued, would not
be adverse to the public interest.

In failing to do so, the

court committed legal error and necessarily abused its discretion
in issuing an injunction.

Vacation of the injunction is

therefore warranted.
An additional error that justifies vacation of the
preliminary injunction is the district court's refusal to apply
the statutory standard for review of a municipality's land use
decision.
Under the Utah Code, the Town Council's decision to
suspend the prior plat approval of Wild Willow's subdivision is
presumed to be valid, and a court reviewing that decision may
9

"determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal."

The trial court ignored this statutory

standard of judicial review in concluding that Wild Willow had
demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
By doing so, it allowed Wild Willow to escape a burden it was
required to shoulder and to avoid the in-depth legal analysis
that normally would be required to satisfy the "substantial
likelihood of success" prong of the preliminary injunction rule.
The plain language of the statute simply does not permit such a
result.
In short, the court again committed legal error and
necessarily abused its discretion in issuing an injunction.
Based on this error and the error discussed above, this Court
should vacate the preliminary injunction and remand the case to
the trial court for a determination of the costs and attorneys'
fees, including those incurred on appeal, to be awarded the Town
for its defense against the wrongfully issued injunction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ISSUING A
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WHERE WILD WILLOW
NEITHER SATISFIED NOR ATTEMPTED TO SATISFY
ALL FOUR REQUIREMENTS OF THE PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION RULE, AND WHERE THE COURT DID NOT
FIND THAT ALL FOUR REQUIREMENTS HAD BEEN MET
The district court issued a preliminary injunction
based on a perceived satisfaction by Wild Willow of only two of
the four requirements of Utah's preliminary injunction rule -rule 65A(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
10

In that the plain

language of rule 65A(e) and the case law from which the rule
derives demand satisfaction of all four requirements of the rule
before an injunction may issue, the court committed legal error
and necessarily abused its discretion in granting a preliminary
injunction.
A.

The Legal Standards for Rule 65A(e)

Subsection (e) of rule 65A was completely revised in
1991.

Advisory Committee Note to Rule 65A, Para, (e) (hereafter

"Advisory Comm. Note").

It now provides:

Grounds. A restraining order or preliminary
injunction may issue only upon a showing by
the applicant that:
(1) The applicant will suffer irreparable
harm unless the order or injunction issues;
(2) The threatened injury to the applicant
outweighs whatever damage the proposed order
or injunction may cause the party restrained
or enjoined;
(3) The order or injunction, if issued, would
not be adverse to the public interest; and
(4) There is a substantial likelihood that
the applicant will prevail on the merits of
the underlying claim, or the case presents
serious issues on the merits which should be
the subject of further litigation.
"The [advisory] committee [on the Rules of Civil
Procedure] sought to modernize the grounds for issuance of
injunctive orders by incorporating . . • explicit standards . . .
derived from Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n. v.
Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d 351, 355 (10th Cir. 1986),
and Otero Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 665 F.2d
275, 278 (10th Cir. 1981)."

Advisory Comm. Note.
11

Accordingly,

federal decisions, particularly those from the Tenth Circuit,
will provide much of the road map for this Court's interpretation
of revised rule 65A(e).

Advisory Comm. Note ("The substantial

body of federal case authority in this area should assist the
Utah courts in developing the law under paragraph (e).");
Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Com'n., 814 P.2d 1099, 1102
(Utah 1991) (if the particular rule of civil procedure is taken
from the federal rules, the Court "freely look[s] to federal
authority interpreting that rule").
In addition, certain decisions from this Court
construing the former rule, which do not depend on the specific
language of the former rule, are relevant to the interpretation
and application of the revised rule.
B.

Application of Rule 65A(e) in the Instant Case
In the district court, Wild Willow bore the burden of

showing entitlement to a preliminary injunction.

Utah R. Civ. P.

65A(b) (3); Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 425
(Utah 1983); Blanao v. Thornburah, 942 F.2d 1487, 1492 (10th Cir.
1991).

"[T]o obtain injunctive relief under Utah Rule of Civil

Procedure 65A(e), [Wild Willow] must [have] by argument and
evidence convince[d] the trial court that the requirements [of
the rule] ha[d] been met."

Kasco Serv. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d

86, 94 (Utah 1992) (Stewart, J., dissenting).

To meet that

burden, Wild Willow had to satisfy all four requirements of rule
65A(e).

Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e); Blanao, 942 F.2d at 1492. And,

because a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic
12

remedy, see Systems Concepts, Inc., 669 P.2d at 425; GTE Corp. v.
Williams, 731 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 1984), Wild Willow was
obligated to show a clear and unequivocal right to relief.

SCFC

ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir.
1991).
The preliminary injunction issued here disturbs the
status quo, is in certain respects mandatory as opposed to
prohibitory4, and affords Wild Willow substantially all the
relief it may recover at the conclusion of a full trial on the
merits.

With this type of injunction, Wild Willow was required

to "satisfy an even heavier burden of showing that the four
factors [contained in rule 65A(e)] weighted] heavily and
compellingly in [its] favor before such an injunction . . .
issued."

Id,
This heavier burden is justified because " [a]

preliminary injunction that alters the status quo goes beyond the
traditional purpose for preliminary injunctions, which is only to
preserve the status quo until a trial on the merits may be had."
Id. at 1099.

Further, "[m]andatory injunctions are more

burdensome than prohibitory injunctions because they
affirmatively require the nonmovant to act in a particular way,
and as a result place the issuing court in a position where it
may have to provide ongoing supervision to assure that the
4

The injunction is mandatory insofar as it directs the Town
"to approve the plans and specifications for the utility
improvements" and "to consider and approve, where otherwise
appropriate, the necessary building permits." Prelim. Inj. at 2,
paras. 3, 4 (R. 132).
13

nonmovant is abiding by the injunction."

Id.

"Finally, a

preliminary injunction that awards the movant substantially all
the relief he may be entitled to if he succeeds on the merits is
similar to the 'Sentence First -- Verdict Afterwards' type of
procedure parodied in Alice in Wonderland, which is an anathema
to our system of jurisprudence."

Id. (footnote omitted).

In its motion for a preliminary injunction, Wild Willow
addressed only two of rule 65A(e)'s requirements for issuance of
a preliminary injunction.

See Pltf.'s Motion for TRO and/or

Prelim. Inj. (hereafter "Pltf.'s Mot.") (R. 57-60) (Addendum A ) .
First, it claimed that it would suffer irreparable injury if an
injunction were not issued.
Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e)(1).

Pltf.'s Mot. at 3-4 (R. 59-60); see
Second, without articulating the

point precisely or citing any supporting authority, Wild Willow
asserted that there is a substantial likelihood it will prevail
on its underlying claim that once the Town Council approved the
final plat, Wild Willow had a vested right which could not be
disturbed by the Council.

Pltf.'s Mot. at 2-3 (R. 58-59); see

Utah R. Civ. P. 65A(e)(4).
At the hearing on its motion, Wild Willow did not
expand the argument contained in its papers. Again, it requested
a preliminary injunction based only on the two claims asserted in
writing:

(1) irreparable harm, and (2) substantial likelihood of

success on the merits (T. 3-15, 25-30).
Adopting Wild Willow's position, the district court's
preliminary injunction is based only on a perceived satisfaction
14

of subsections (1) and (4) of rule 65A(e).
on subsections (2) and (3) of the rule.

It made no findings

Indeed, neither Wild

Willow nor the district court even considered those subsections,
which require the applicant to show that "[t]he threatened injury
to the applicant outweighs whatever damage the proposed order or
injunction may cause the party restrained or enjoined," and that
fl

[t]he order or injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to

the public interest."
Even if it were assumed Wild Willow had satisfied
subsections (1) and (4), that is insufficient for the issuance of
a preliminary injunction.

As previously noted, all four

subsections must be satisfied before a preliminary injunction may
issue.

See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc.. 936 F.2d at 1102.

This is obvious from the plain language of the rule, which sets
out the four factors conjunctively, not disjunctively.
65A(e).
point:

Rule

The advisory committee note is equally clear on the
"Federal courts require proof of compliance with each of

the four standards[.]"

Advisory Comm. Note.

In sum, the court failed to follow the requirements of
the rule, thereby committing legal error and necessarily abusing
its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction.

See Birch

Creek Irrigation v. Prothero, 858 P.2d 990, 993 (Utah 1993)
(appellate court reviews a trial court's decision to grant or
deny an injunction for abuse of discretion); Gaw v. State, 798
P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah App. 1990) (because the trial court based
its decision to exclude expert testimony on the court's
15

misconception of the law, that decision was necessarily an abuse
of discretion); Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande R.R.. 830 P.2d
291, 297 (Utah App.) (trial court abuses its discretion when it
exceeds the procedural authority granted it by the court rules),
cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
In a similar context, this Court has held that the
trial court abuses its discretion in issuing a temporary
restraining order without strictly complying with the
requirements of rule 65A(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
858 P.2d at 994-95.

That same abuse of discretion exists here;

accordingly, this Court should vacate the preliminary injunction.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE
DEFERENTIAL STATUTORY STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF
A MUNICIPALITY'S LAND USE DECISION IN
CONCLUDING THAT WILD WILLOW IS LIKELY TO
PREVAIL ON ITS CLAIM THAT THE TOWN COUNCIL
IMPROPERLY SUSPENDED THE PRIOR PLAT APPROVAL
FOR WILD WILLOW'S SUBDIVISION
In concluding that Wild Willow had demonstrated a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits and therefore was
entitled to a preliminary injunction, the district court refused
to apply the standard for review of a municipality's land use
decision set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3) (1992).

This

error provides an additional ground for vacation of the
preliminary injunction.
A.

The Trial Court Failed to Apply The
Statutory Standard for Judicial Review

The legislature has mandated that a municipality's land
use decision is to be presumed valid and a reviewing court "shall
16

. . . determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal."

§ 10-9-1001(3).

See also Mantua Town

v. Carr, 584 P.2d 912, 913 (Utah 1978); Crestview-Holladay
Homeowners A s s o c , Inc. v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d 1150, 115152 (Utah 1976) .

Thus, in its suit against the Town, Wild Willow

bears the burden of demonstrating that the Council's decision to
suspend the final plat approval was arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal.

To have properly issued the preliminary injunction, the

district court must have found a substantial likelihood that Wild
Willow will prevail on that issue.

See Utah R. Civ. P.

65A(e) (4) .
The Town argued the section 10-9-1001 (3)5 to the
district court in opposing Wild Willow's motion for a preliminary
injunction.

See Defs.' Mem. in Oppos. to TRO and/or Prelim. Inj.

at 4 (R. 73). Nevertheless, Wild Willow did not address the
standard of review question either in its written motion or
during oral argument on the motion (R. 57-63; T. 3-15, 25-30).
Indeed, it was not until the Town again noted section 10-91001(3) in its objections to the written preliminary injunction
(R. 115) that Wild Willow even acknowledged the provision.

It

then argued that the statute did not place the burden on Wild
Willow, but instead required the Town to "show that the actions
of the former Town Council were arbitrary and capricious" in

5

The Town's papers in the district court erroneously cited
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1002 (1992), rather than section 10-91001(3), as the standard of review provision (R. 73, 115). This
was a typographical error.
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order to justify the new Council's subsequent actions.

Pltf.'s

Resp. to Objs. at 3 (R. 125).
Obviously agreeing with Wild Willow's implicit argument
that section 10-9-1001(3) did not apply to Wild Willow's request
for judicial review, the district court refused to incorporate
the statutory standard of review in either its preliminary
injunction or findings of fact and conclusions of law.
so, the court misconstrued the statute.

In doing

That section 10-9-

1001(3) applies to Wild Willow's judicial attack on the Council's
suspension of the prior plat approval (a "land use decision") is
clear from the express terms of the statute:

"The courts shall:

(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid;
and (b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or illegal."

In short, the burden was on Wild

Willow, the party seeking judicial review, to show that the
Council acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or illegally in
suspending the prior plat approval.

The trial court erred in not

requiring Wild Willow to meet this burden.
B.

The Trial Court Compounded Its Error

Wild Willow's and the district court's fundamental
misunderstanding of the allocation of burden created an
additional, related defect in the injunction proceeding.
Apparently believing the burden was not its, Wild Willow did not
present a thorough analysis of the central issue in the lawsuit:
whether the Council could properly suspend the prior plat
approval.
18

All that Wild Willow did in the district court was to
argue it had a vested right in the former Council's December 1993
approval of the first phase of its development, and that the new
Council could not disturb the prior approval.

It submitted no

memorandum of law to support its position, content to cite only a
single case (Anderson v. Judd, 404 P.2d 553 (Colo. 1965) (en
banc)) at the preliminary injunction hearing (R. 30) -- a case
which does not support Wild Willow's sweeping view that the prior
plat approval was essentially immune from reconsideration or
modification.

See Anderson, 404 P.2d at 557 (a municipal

legislative body may reconsider its actions even after the rights
of third parties have become vested so long as proper notice and
opportunity for hearing are provided).
Contrary to what occurred below, Wild Willow was
required to demonstrate that there is a substantial likelihood of
success on the issue of whether the Council's suspension action
was "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal."

To do so, it

necessarily had to acknowledge a large body of law relevant to
the issue of whether the Town Council could suspend the prior
plat approval.
Numerous court decisions recognize a municipality's
power to reconsider and then revoke or modify a prior action,
including a prior plat approval.

See, e.g., Parker v. Bd. of

County Com'rs., Etc., 603 P.2d 1098 (N.M. 1979) (upholding
revocation of final plat approval based on subdivider's failure
to meet county road requirements); Ceresa v. City of Peru, 273
19

N.E.2d 407, 409 (111. App. 1971) (deliberative bodies such as a
city council have continuing power and authority to consider from
time to time matters within their jurisdiction, and generally,
any such reconsideration or renewed consideration may be
independent of any action that was taken or not taken in the
past).

This is so even if rights have become "vested."

Anderson

v. Judd. 404 P.2d at 557. Further, the Utah Code clearly
contemplates that the governing body of a municipality may
reconsider and take appropriate action with respect to a
previously approved subdivision plat.

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-

9-808(1) (a) (1992) (providing that "the governing body of a
municipality may, with or without a petition, consider any
proposed vacation, alteration, or amendment of a subdivision
plat").
Wild Willow failed to address any of the foregoing
legal authority.

It also failed to analyze this Court's

decisions holding that a municipality must follow its own
ordinances in conducting business, something the former Council
did not do in approving Wild Willow's plat.

See, e.g., West

Gallery Corp. v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Com'rs., 537 P.2d 1027,
1028 (Utah 1975) (affirming trial court's injunction against city
commission which had failed to follow procedures as set forth in
city ordinance); Carter v. Provo City, 6 Utah 2d 154, 307 P.2d
906 (1957) (municipal corporation was required to comply with
city charter and could not properly execute construction contract
in contravention of charter's requirements).
20

Additionally, Wild Willow failed to consider another
well established principle in this Court's jurisprudence:
although local governments have no inherent police power, the
legislative grant of general welfare authority to local
governments is construed liberally to allow municipalities to
provide for the health, safety, and welfare of their residents.
See, e.g., Redwood Gvm v. Salt Lake County Com'n., 624 P.2d 1138,
1143 (Utah 1981); State v. Hutchison, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah
1980) .

See also Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-1-103 and 10-8-84 (1992) .

The Council's concern for the Town's health, safety, and welfare
was clearly the touchstone of its suspension decision.
Finally, insofar as Wild Willow's "vested right"
argument implied that the new Council was estopped from
disturbing the prior plat approval, it failed even to acknowledge
that Utah's appellate courts have long disfavored application of
the equitable estoppel doctrine to a municipality's land use
decisions.

See Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980);

Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 803 (Utah App.
1992); Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283, 290 (Utah App.
1994) .
In sum, Wild Willow failed to advise the trial court of
the expansive legal landscape relevant to the core issue in this
case.

Indeed, it did not give the trial court even a cursory

analysis of the pertinent law.

Certainly, this is the very least

the moving party is required to do for purposes of rule
65A(e) (4) .

Therefore, the trial court compounded its error
21

concerning the statutory standard of review by erroneously
issuing a preliminary injunction in the face of Wild Willow's
woefully inadequate legal analysis and consequent failure to
demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, the Court should
vacate the preliminary injunction and remand the case for a
determination of the costs and attorney's fees, including those
incurred on appeal, to be awarded the Town for its defense
against the wrongfully issued injunction.

See Utah R. Civ. P.

65A(c).

A
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3

day of August, 1994.

TESCH, THOMPSON &
SONNENREICH, L.C.
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ADDENDUM A

Craig G. Adamson (0024)
Eric P. Lee (4870)

DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

,

Attorneys for plaintiff
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
WILD WILLOW LIMITED
COMPANY, a Utah Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff,

:
:

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND/OR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

:

v.

:

THE TOWN OF FRANCIS, a
Municipal corporation; BRAD
McNEIL, individually and as Mayor
of the Town of Francis,

:
Civil No. 940300048CV

Defendants.
—oooOooo™
The plaintiff, by and through its counsel of record and pursuant to Rule 65A, Utah R.
Civ. P., herewith petitions the Court for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction as follows:
1. For an order prohibiting and restraining the defendants, their agents, employees and
attorneys from enforcing that certain Stop Order Notice dated May 16, 1994 and signed by the

JLI^

defendant Brad McNeil, which purportedly seeks to prevent the ongoing construction of the
utility improvements for the development known as Wild Willow Planned Development.
2. For an order prohibiting and enjoining the defendants, their agents, employees and
attorneys from taking any action which purports to rescind the final approval of the Wild Willow
Planned Development except in accordance with local ordinance or state law.
3. For an order directing the Town of Francis, by and through the town engineer, to
approve the plans and specifications for the utility improvements on the development known as
Wild Willow Planned Development and to advise the plaintiff as to the method of inspection of
such improvements as they are constructed.
This motion is made upon the grounds set forth in the Amended Verified Complaint of
plaintiff, which establishes the following:
1. Plaintiff is the owner and developer of property located within the boundaries of the
Town of Francis and known as the Wild Willow Planned Development.
2. Plaintiff sought and received final approval for the subdivision plat for Phase I of the
development from the Town of Francis on or about December 15, 1993. In accordance with
such approval a subdivision plat, properly executed and approved by the Town Council of the
Town and bearing all other necessary signatures and certifications was recorded with the Office
of the Summit County Recorder on January 4, 1994 at 11:24 a.m. as Entry No. 395194.
3.

On or about March 25, 1994 the plaintiff received a written notice from attorney

Jon C. Heaton, counsel for the Town of Francis, wherein plaintiff was advised that the defendant
Town had rescinded the final approval of the plat.

2

U J 0 \j -J o

4. Plaintiff has, with the knowledge of the Town, proceeded with the granting of a
contract to a contractor for the installation of the utility and road improvements in the project.
5. On or about April 19, 1994 the town engineer was given a complete set of the plans
and specifications for the utility and road improvements and was asked for his approval.
6. To date no approval nor disapproval has been given.
7. Plaintiff has executed a construction agreement and has required that the contractor
go forward with the utility improvements.

On or about May 16, 1994 plaintiff received a

document entitled Stop Order Notice, a true and correct copy is attached as Exhibit "A" and by
this reference incorporated herein. In Exhibit HAM the Town states its belief that the Wild
Willow project has not been approved for commencement of construction.
8. By reason of said Stop Order Notice plaintiff is prevented from continuing with the
orderly construction of the utility improvements as is its right. If construction is not allowed
to immediately proceed, plaintiff is in danger of not finishing the improvements during this
building season, will incur substantial additional costs and will lose, in all likelihood, numerous
lot sales.
9. Plaintiff presently suffers and shall continue to suffer great and irreparable injury in
that it is prevented from the lawful and proper use of its property in accordance with state and
local law.
10. Until an injunction is entered as requested herein, plaintiff has no adequate remedy
at law and is prevented from the continued development of its property.
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11. The only method by which plaintiff can avoid such irreparable injury is through the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction whereby the defendant
is restrained as requested herein.
12. The issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction in this
matter will not result in any injury or harm to the defendants. Accordingly the requirement of
a bond should be made nominal or waived entirely.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff prays that a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction be issued restraining and enjoining the defendants as set out above,
pending a trial on the merits of this matter and a determination that the issues raised by the
Amended Verified Complaint of plaintiff; and that the amount of the bond required by Rule
65A(c), Utah R. Civ. P., be waived or set at a nominal amount.
DATED this 1 " day of May, 1994
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

^
C
^
ERIC P. LEE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the / '

day of May, 1994, a true and accurate copy of the

foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:

Joseph E. Tesch
TESCH, THOMPSON & SONNENREICH
P.O. Box 3390
Park City, Utah 84060

Pamela K. McDermaid
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Exhibit "A"

OOOQ^

F R A N C I S

TOWN
C O R P O R A T I O N
P.O. Box 6M
Kasms, UT 84036
(W1) 783-2148

STOP

ORDER

NOTICE

May 1 6 , 1994

GRANT HONE - CONTRACTOR AND ANY OTHERS TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
It hae come to our attention that your company Is preparing to
excavate into our atreets and lntenda to connect with our water and
sewer systems # apparently to provide service to the Wild Willow POD
development.
This letter shall eerve ae Notice to you that the Wild Willow
project hae not been and la not now approved for commencement Of
construction*
No letter of authorization nor permit has been
given.
There are eeveral unresolved matters which are not in
compliance with the Development Code and other ordinances of
Francis Town. Our attorney is working with the Developer to get
theee Items worked out in a manner acceptable to the Town.
In the meantime, no one has authorization nor permission to
cut into our etreete, nor to connect to any utility systems in
Francis Town until further notice. No excavation permits have been
Issued and no approvals for commencement of the Project have been
given. The State Uniform Building Code (SECTION 70) providee for
proper permite and authority from the municipality prior to any
excavation.
Failure to comply with this Order shall rssult in prosecution
to the full extent allowed by law.
TOWN OF FRANCIS

Brad McK.il • Mayor
cc;

Joe Teach, Attny
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Craig G. Adamson (0024)
Eric P. Lee (4870)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for plaintiff
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
WILD WILLOW LIMITED
COMPANY, a Utah Limited
Liability Company,

AFFIDAVIT OF C. TAYLOR BURTON

Plaintiff,
v.
THE TOWN OF FRANCIS, a
Municipal corporation; BRAD
McNEIL, individually and as Mayor
of the Town of Francis,

Civil No. 940300048CV

Defendants.
—oooOooo--

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
:s
:ss
)

C. Taylor Burton being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1. That Affiant is the managing agent of plaintiff and makes this affidavit on his own
personal knowledge and belief.

oojir; i

2. That Affiant has been personally involved in the development of the Wild Willow
Project from its inception and has supervised and directed all steps of the approval process.
3. That throughout the approval process Affiant and other agents dealt directly with the
Town officials, including the Mayor Paul Mitchell and the Town Planning Commission.
4. That in each step of the process Affiant made adjustments, amendments and revisions
to meet and satisfy the concerns of the Town officials and otherwise complied with any and all
requirements imposed upon the development by the various Town officials.
5. That to the knowledge of Affiant the Town followed its Development Code as it
proceeded through the approval process for the project. Ultimately the first phase was approved
and the plat signed by not only Paul Mitchell, as the Mayor of the Town, but by the chairman
of the Planning Commission and the Town attorney.
6. That the Town engineer, Mr. Derek Radke, was given a complete set of the drawings
for the utility and road improvements on the project on April 19, 1994 by Mr. Jim Kaiserman,
project engineer.
7. That despite repeated requests for approval of the plans and specifications so that
construction could commence, the engineer has neither approved nor disapproved the same.
8. That in reliance upon the recordation of the final plat for Phase One, Affiant has
entered into agreements for the sale of twenty-two lots. Some of these lots have closed, others
are pending closing in the next few weeks.
9. That in order to allow the lot owners to commence construction on their individual
lots, and in order not to lose the current construction season, and with the knowledge of the
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Town, Affiant has entered into a construction contract and has caused the contractor to
commence the preliminary work on the utility and road improvements, including the delivery
of materials and the staking of the property.
10. That unless construction proceeds immediately, Affiant is in danger of losing the
contractor, who will be forced to take on other work and abandon this project. Alternatively,
Affiant will be charged a fee by the contractor for each day work is stopped. In addition,
Affiant will be in jeopardy of being unable to complete the improvements during this building
season, thereby losing the ability to sell the remaining lots.
11. Throughout the entire approval process the defendant McNeil has made his presence
known, has voiced his stringent opposition to the project and has publicly vowed to stop the
project if possible.
12. Affiant is informed and therefore alleges that since McNeil became Mayor he has
continued to voice his opposition to the project, has taken over the duties of the Town Building
Inspector with respect to the issuance of building permits, has required that all requests for
permits from Wild Willow be processed by him and has denied any requests for permits.
DATED this /9\m

of May, 1994.

C. Taylor Burfon

OOOOOo

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:ss

Subscribed to be^osa-iggJBus / \ ,-day of May, 1994

IOTARY PUBLIC
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the J n

day of May, 1994, a true and accurate copy of the

foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:

Joseph E. Tesch
TESCH, THOMPSON & SONNENREICH
P.O. Box 3390
Park City, Utah 84060

yIYld),^rjd
Pamela K. McDermaid

(PKM)

C:\WP51\PLEADING\WILDTOWJ\FB

\.; \j U J *J /

ADDENDUM B

25

ADDENDUM B

rto. __
Craig G. Adamson (0024)
Eric P. Lee (4870)
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DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN

Jim

Attorneys for plaintiff
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
WILD WILLOW LIMITED
COMPANY, a Utah Limited
Liability Company,

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Plaintiff,

THE TOWN OF FRANCIS, a
Municipal corporation; BRAD
McNEIL, individually and as Mayor
of the Town of Francis,

Civil No. 940300048CV

Defendants.
—oooOooo—
The motion of the plaintiff for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction having come on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled Court on Wednesday,
May 25, 1994, the Honorable David S. Young presiding; the parties and counsel being present;
the Court having reviewed various evidence including documents, having heard the arguments

BCCtC -PAGE 0 3 5

of counsel and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being otherwise
fully apprised in the facts and law;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction is hereby
granted, and the defendants and each of them, together with their agents, employees or any
independent contractor employed by them, are enjoined, restrained and directed as follows:
1. From enforcing that certain Stop Order Notice dated May 16, 1994.
2. From taking any action which purports to rescind the final approval of Wild Willow
Planned Development including any action to put the approval of said project on hold.
3. The Town is hereby directed, by and through the Town engineer, to approve the plans
and specifications for the utility improvements and to advise plaintiff as to the method of
inspection of such improvements as they are constructed.
4. The Town is hereby directed, by and through the appropriate officials, to consider
and approve, where otherwise appropriate, the necessary building permits.
Nothing in this order shall prohibit the defendants from taking such actions with respect
to the further construction of the development which are in accordance with generally accepted
and reasonable engineering principals and standards, where appropriate.
DATED this

^ 9 y of^feyrfe94.
BY THE COURT:

4 V SUMMIT
David S. Youn
District Court
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Approved as to form:

Joseph E. Tesch
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the

day of May, 1994, a true and accurate copy of the

foregoing was hand delivered to the following:

Joseph E. Tesch
TESCH, THOMPSON & SONNENREICH
P.O. Box 3390
Park City, Utah 84060
Clerk of the Court, Summit County
50 North Main
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
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Attorneys for plaintiff
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-6383
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—oooOooo—
WILD WILLOW LIMITED
COMPANY, a Utah Limited
Liability Company,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF ORDER GRANTING
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

v.
THE TOWN OF FRANCIS, a
Municipal corporation; BRAD
McNEIL, individually and as Mayor
of the Town of Francis,

Civil No. 940300048CV

Defendants.
—oooOooo—

The motion of the plaintiff for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction having come on regularly for hearing before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable
David S. Young presiding on Wednesday, May 25, 1994 at the hour of 1:30 p.m.; the plaintiff
being present and represented by its counsel, Craig G. Adamson, and the defendants being
present and represented by their counsel, Joseph E. Tesch. The Court having reviewed the

Verified Complaint, Amended Verified Complaint, Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction and Affidavit of C. Taylor Burton, together with the memorandum of the
defendants in opposition to said motion; the Court having heard the arguments of counsel and
having reviewed the final plat of Phase I of the Wild Willow Planned Development; the Court
being otherwise advised in the premises now enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff is the owner of the property which is the subject matter of this action and
which is known as the Wild Willow Planned Development.
2.

The final plat of Phase I of Wild Willow Planned Development was given final

approval by the defendant Town of Francis on or about December 14, 1993.
3. The final plat, bearing the necessary approval signatures of the public utilities, the
approval signatures of the Town of Francis Planning Commission, the Town of Francis engineer,
the Town attorney and the Town of Francis Board was recorded with the office of the Summit
County Recorder on January 4, 1994.
4. The defendant Town of Francis purported to rescind the final approval of Phase I of
Wild Willow Planned Development by letter dated March 25, 1994 signed by Jon C. Heaton,
counsel for the Town.
5.

Immediately subsequent to the recording of the final plat for Phase I plaintiff

commenced the activity necessary to construct the utility and road improvements including the
hiring of a contractor, the execution of a construction contract and the sale of lots.
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6. On or about May 16, 1994 the defendant Town issued a document entitled "Stop
Order Notice" seeking to stop further construction of the utility improvements.
7. On May 24, 1994 the defendant Town held a special meeting of the Town Council
at which meeting a vote was taken to put the approval of Phase I of Wild Willow Development
on "hold.M
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That by reason of the final approval of Phase I and the recording of the plat, plaintiff
has a vested right to proceed with the development of the subdivision.
2. That by reason of the actions of the Town, plaintiff is suffering and will continue to
suffer great and irreparable harm in the form of lost lot sales, the loss of the contractor and/or
substantial cost for delay, the loss of a building season with attendant costs and expenses,
together with the loss of use of the property in accordance with the vested rights of plaintiff.
3. That the plaintiff has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.
4. That a preliminary injunction, in accordance with the motion of the plaintiff, should
issue, and that the requirement of a bond should be waived.

DATED this

3^^of^fi^^94.
BY THE COURT:

1 ^ / SUMMIT Xn\
David S. Young
District Court Jul
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Approved as to form:

Joseph E. Tesch
Attorney for defendants

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the

day of May, 1994, a true and accurate copy of the

foregoing was hand delivered to the following:

Joseph E. Tesch
TESCH, THOMPSON & SONNENREICH
P.O. Box 3390
Park City, Utah 84060
Clerk of the Court, Summit County
50 North Main
P.O. Box 128
Coalville, Utah 84017
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